Jim’ale The Jihadi Organ Grinder and his Little Tweeting Monkey

Ilhan Omar and the Jihadi Organ Grinder

On August 25, 2019, Ilhan Omar tweeted a cryptic post stating:

“Somali government and peacekeeping forces, need to protect @Hormuud and the Somali telecom industry as they make enormous contribution to the economy and provide vital services. During my visit to Somalia in 2011, I was surprised by the quick evolution of the technology in Somalia.”

Ilhan Omar Save Hormuud
Image 1: Ilhan Omar’s Hormuud Telecom tweet

What Ilhan Omar omitted in her tweet was the actual reasons why she promoted Hormuud, the identity of the people that facilitated her 2011 and subsequent trips to Somalia, and their agendas. Considering the fact that Omar (known back in Somalia as Elmi) has protected status and carries a non-expiring ‘Do not investigate me with extreme prejudice’ certificate, I decided to shed some light on the main subject of her tweet: the mysterious Somali Telecom Hormuud and its founder, Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale—a  cuddly, lovable man with a henna dyed beard and a ceaseless passion for violent jihad.

Who is Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale
Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale AKA ‘Jim’ale’ is one of the wealthiest Somali businessmen and is the founder of the Al Barakat group of companies. He is also the owner of Hormuud Telecom. Beside his business interests, Jim’ale also happens to be the leading financier of the al-Shabaab, a Somali Salafi jihadi terrorist organization which since 2006 has been responsible for dozens of car and suicide bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and targeted killing of thousands of innocent Somalis.

In the mid-2000s, Jim’ale gained enough notoriety to get added to US and UN travel bans, assets freeze databases, and targeted arms embargo lists imposed by paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of Resolution 1844.

Ali Yousif Ahmed Al-Nouri
Image 2: Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale, the red-bearded jihadi founder of the Somali Hormuud Telecom and the Barakat money transfer companies

Jim’ale is not some small-time Kalashnikov wielding terrorist. He is a well known and respected jihadi leader and in this capacity he served in several executive roles within the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, AKA the ‘Somali Islamic Courts Union’. This was the most radical Somali jihadi Islamist political element, the same one which eventually formed the military group known as al-Shabaab (The Youth). Al-Shabab’s ideology is based on hardcore Salafism and Wahhabism and aggressively promotes the concepts of takfir, the excommunication and killing of apostates or unbelievers. The groups political objective is to create an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa that would include not only Somalia but also Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

In 2010, Al-Shabaab was targeted in sanctions by the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 concerning Somalia and Eritrea (the “Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee”). According to the July 18, 2011 report (S/2011/433 Item # 71), Jim’ale was identified as:

“…Al-Shabaab not only attracts their business by imposing lower rates of taxation in Kismaayo than at ports controlled by the Transitional Federal Government but also actively promotes large scale imports of sugar and exports of charcoal by offering preferential access and tax breaks to Al-Shabaab affiliated businesses. Two of the most prominent figures in the network are businessmen with historical linkages to militant Islamist groups in Somalia: Abukar Omar Adaani and Ahmed Nur Jim’aale.

Jim’ale was also marked as being related to the Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, another Ilhan Omar idol, who triggered the Battle of Mogadishu:

“Mohamad Warsame is from the same sub-clan as General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, and was once known as being General Aidid’s representative in Bakaara market. Through his presence in Bakaara, he has developed a working relationship with Mr. Jim’ale.”

Jim’ale’s support for Somali Islamic fundamentalist terror goes far beyond a business venture; he is openly aligned with the al-Shabaab and other jihadi Salafi strategy and ideology. In the past, he provided major funding and political support for Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was listed by the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee. Former al-Shabaab Deputy Emir Muktar Robow also collaborated closely with Aweys and Jim’ale in consolidating their leadership role during the early 2010s in al-Shabaab’s political and ideological leadership struggle.

Sample imagery published by the Somali opposition account “ToughStrategy”
Image 3: Sample imagery published by the Somali opposition account “ToughStrategy” about the untouchable Jim’ale, which got him banned from Twitter

In 2007, Jim’ale established a front company in Djibouti for jihadi financing and logistics called the Investors Group (in 2012, it made it onto the UN terror watch list). One of the goals of the group was to destabilize Somaliland through the funding of extremist activities and weapons purchases (an objective which Ilhan Omar supports). The group provided the funding and logistics in smuggling small arms of Qatari and Turkish origin from Eritrea through Djibouti into the 5th region of Ethiopia, where the Salafi jihadi groups received the shipments. 

Transportation equipment used to smuggle weapons and ammunition
Image 4: Transportation equipment used to smuggle weapons and ammunition

In 2009, Jim’ale managed one of the largest Hawala funds in Somalia where he collected zakat (alms for the poor). The majority of the proceedings from this fund were routed to al-Shabaab. In the same year Jim’ale also worked with other like-minded individuals to undermine the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by not participating in Somali reconciliation efforts. 

The 2009 United Nations Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia identifies Jim’ale as one al-Shabaab’s chief financiers (pages 10-11). It also directly linked his company Hormuud to al-Shabaab.

In 2010, Jim’ale established several mobile-to-mobile money transfer businesses such as ZAAD and offered them to al-Shabaab to make international money transfers more difficult to trace by eliminating the need to show any form of identification at the point of transaction.

Somalia Mobile money Payments a major source of funding for Al-Shabaab
Image 5
: Somali Telecom, money exchanges, and mobile payment platforms owned and controlled by Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale are one of the major sources of funding for al-Shabaab

By 2011, Jim’ale was actively supporting al-Shabaab by offering them free cellphone communications, use of company vehicles, food, aid, and political advice. He also organized fundraisers for al-Shabaab through various Somali business groups. This fundraising activity included anonymous Turkish and Qatari donations to Jim’ale’s ‘charitable ventures’ which in turn used Djibouti based financial intermediaries to send that money to al-Shabaab.

Jim’ale is by no means a silent business partner in Hormuud Telecom, rather he is in full control of the company and its donations to al-Shabaab affiliates. These include large lump sum payments in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. In addition to the logistics support, Jim’ale through Hormuud has also provided al-Shabaab with privately paid foreign fighters from countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Spokespersons for moderate Somali groups have also warned the Somali people not to use Hormuud Telecom because Hormuud personnel listen-in on all conversations and share the intelligence with al-Shabaab.

In 2016, in part due to a large amount of progressive political lobbying and lubricating a lot of palms with tons of ‘grease’, President Obama’s state department and the US treasury removed Jim’ale from their registries and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list.

Sampling of al-Shabab Jihadi Terror Attacks in Mogadishu
Image 6
: The butcher’s bill for one year of Hormuud Telecom funding for al-Shabaab. Some of these massive death figures repeat themselves in 2018

Harmuud, the Little Jihadi Shindig
The following short listing of Hormuud staff members who have transitioned from the corporate world to full-time employment in hands-on jihadist terrorism helps illustrate the tight coupling between Jim’ale, Hormuud Telecom, al-Shabaab, and several associated large scale terror attacks in Somalia:

  1. Khalif Warsame (Khalif Adale): head of NGO affairs of al-Shabaab, was a member of Hormuud telecom executive team. He is married to Nadifo Ali Jim’ale, the sister of the chairman of Hormuud Ahmed-nur Ali Jim’ale. Nadifo currently resides in the UAE.
  2. Dahir Ga’amey (Abdi Al Haq): chief judge of al-Shabaab, was a member of the executive team of Hormuud Telecom and Jim’ale’s Al Barakat group of companies.
  3. Hassan Muhidin Hassan (Bistolo weyneh): was manager of the Hormuud Telecom office in Villa Somalia. He took part in the al-Shabaab operation to assassinate former Somali prime minister by driving the hit team in his car.
  4. Abdiweli Ahmed Diriye: was a top Hormuud Telecom administrative official. He enabled the safe passage of an explosives loaded truck that killed over 500 people in Mogadishu on October 14, 2017.
  5. Mukhtar Haji Mohamud: was a senior representative of Taaj express; a company owned by Hormuud Telecom Albarakat group wired the money that was used to purchase the explosive truck. The money was wired to Italy to Sheikh Hassan, representative of Taaj Express. He is the person who bought the truck that was used during the October 14, 2017 massacre.
  6. Haji Qaaluu Abdi Ad Ali Jim’ale: an executive member of Hormuud Telecom, was the operational coordinator of the October 14, 2017 truck bomb. He is also the nephew of Ahmed-nur Ali Jim’ale and a card carrying member of the Amniyat branch of al-Shabaab.
  7. Basira Abdi (real name Maryan): the woman who carried out the suicide attack that killed Mogadishu mayor Abdurahman Yarisow, graduated from Al Nur school, the school is managed by Hormud Telecom and Al-Barakat group.
  8. Abdikarim Mohamed Kariye: the al-Shabaab head of finance, was the operations manager of Hormuud Telecom, Taaj Express, Alburuuj Construction, Salaam Somali Bank, and Beco Powering, all Hormuud group subsidiaries of the Al-Barakat Group.
  9. Abdihakim Hassan Idow (Hiirane): a former top official of Hormuud Telecom and Salaam Bank Africa–Djibouti, is the head of al-Shabaab logistics in the Horn of Africa.

Hormuud telecom top officials who are also directly affiliated with the al-shabab Jihadi Terrorist organization
Image 7: Sampling of Hormuud Telecom top officials who are also directly affiliated with the al-Shabaab jihadi terrorist organization

So, there you have it. Ilhan Omar, a sitting Minnesota congresswoman, is openly promoting on social media the interests of Hormuud, a known front and funding source of al-Shabaab, a jihadi terrorist organization with the blood of thousands of innocent Somalis on its hands. Considering just how outrageous all of this should be, you’ve got to give Omar credit where credit is due: in one year, she managed to acquire the best political and media kevlar vest money can buy and is now dodging every funding and FARA question without even blinking.

A US based muslim Somali Ilhan Omar Supporter promoting al-Shabab terror attacks
Image 8
: What Ilhan Omar’s Somali fellow clan members think about Harmuud and it’s affiliation with al-Shabaab. A US based Muslim Somali Ilhan Omar supporter named Reggie Warsame promoting al-Shabaab terror attacks

So what do we learn from this abridged tale of third world tale of grift and corruption and Islamic terror? Perhaps it is that in this post-modern world, we (and our federal three letter agencies) just can’t be judgmental about fluid and passé concepts like terrorism, treason, and murder. Considering this epiphany, it may not be a bad idea for US treasury and the constituents of Minnesota’s 5th congressional district to chip in and indeed help “protect” the Somali Hormuud Telecom. Because if they don’t, al-Shabaab may run into financial difficulties and have to cut back on their suicide car bomb program for 2020. And who wants that?

References and Sourcing
XRVision Sentinel AI Platform – Face recognition, image reconstruction, and object classification

Muslim fraternitati fieri delenda est!

Copyright 2020 Yaacov Apelbaum, All Rights Reserved.

The Jihad News Network

Jihad Media Network 360

In the past few years there has been a surge in the quality and quantity of jihadi media, evident from the wealth of texts, films, and other multimedia content that is distributed by Islamist websites on a daily basis. What started as a handful of jihadi media organizations in the early 2000s has within just a few years mushroomed into a vast network of regional and international media branches throughout the Middle East, Asia, the Americas, and Europe. Surprisingly, these news outlets which claim to operate independently from each other and autonomously from a global umbrella organization, exhibited only a modest learning curve. The professional quality of their news productions is indistinguishable from that of most Middle Eastern mainstream broadcast channels such as Al-Jazeera. Moreover, the product that they purportedly create independently across multiple theaters of operation is uniform in both style and content and conforms to commercial media standards.

In this post we will examine these implicit and explicit claims of independence and try to determine if the jihadi media outlets—whether global or local—are operating under a centralized organization with a coordinated media network (which more resembles a large news cooperation) rather than local grassroots cells.

The Jihadi Media Network
In 2010, the following four media organizations generated the bulk of the original jihadist internet content:

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Logo

Organization Name

1

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Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)

2

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Al-Furqan “The Criterion”

3

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Al-Fajr “The Dawn”

4

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Al-Sahab “The Cloud”

Figure 1: The four primary jihadi media producers

Aside from these four organizations which monopolized the mainstream jihadi media landscape, there was a multitude of smaller outlets that ostensibly acted as independent distributers of jihadi material (Figure 2). Over the next six years, many of these previously unknown entities began producing regional content specializing mostly in low visibility conflict areas. The content generated by these secondary media organizations encompassed multiple subjects such as battlefield operations, news releases, and political commentary. The content was multilingual, carefully scripted, and edited to reasonable broadcast standards, and targeted both domestic and  international audiences.

#

Logo

Organization Name

#

Logo

Organization Name

1

clip_image001[4]

Al-Andalus

10

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Shield of Islam Brigades

2

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Al-Ansar

11

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The Jihad Media Battalion

3

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Al-Malahim

 

12

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Hizb Al-Islam of Turkistan Media Center

4

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Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

13

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Leemedia Network

5

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Al-Yaqeen Media

14

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Manba’ Al-Jihad

6

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Islamic Party of Turkistan

15

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Nida Al-Jihad Center for Media Production

7

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Jaysh Al-Islam

16

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Taifetul Mansura

8

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Abdullah Azzam Brigades

17

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Jama’at Al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad

9

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Kataib Siham Al-Haqq

 

Figure 2: Secondary jihadi media producers and distributors

The  Al-Fallujah jihadist forum
Figure 3:
A snapshot from Al-Fallujah jihadist forum

Traditional Media Distribution Channels
Though the secondary jihadi news outlets (SJNO) appeared to brand the media as their own, the evidence raises doubts regarding the actual independence of these outlets. As autonomous local media producers and distributors with a limited budget, we would expect SJNO to utilize only low cost and free Web 2.0-3.0 publication platforms such as video-sharing sites (e.g. YouTube and LiveLeak), third-party websites, forums, and blogs to distribute their own material independently.[1] Yet, often SJNO have their films and texts distributed simultaneously by multiple mainstream news outlets using expensive broadcast TV and satellite channels. In terms of scope and outreach, these organizations successfully emulated the broadcast models of large news networks such as the BBC and France 2.

image                image
Figure 4: Al-Rai TV broadcast of Al-Ansar     Figure 5: Al-Zawraa TV broadcast

A case in point is Zawraa TV,  which later became Al-Rai TV.[2][3] This Syrian-based channel, owned by Mish’an Al-Jabouri, transmitted looped satellite programming focusing mainly on pro-Sunni, anti-Shi’ite propaganda, and broadcasted 24/7 footage including violent attacks by local jihad organizations against U.S. forces.[4] The channel made no effort to hide its affiliation with the jihadi groups as logos of the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI) and other jihadi organizations periodically appeared in its footage and films.[5] As can be seen from Figures 4-5, in this dual mode, the host of the show would periodically assume the role of a pistolero by shedding his tailored suit and slip into army fatigues, bullet proof vest, and a keffiyeh. Clearly, the relations between Al-Rai and the SJNO whose products the channel broadcasted were not the typical business relations one would expect to find between a commercial TV station and an advertising client. If Al-Rai TV was true commercial for profit television, broadcasting through it would not have been economically feasible for the SJNO. The fact that the channel mostly devoted itself to broadcasting SJNO video and commentary suggests that the relationship between the two was more political/ideological than commercial.

Presence and Significance of Metadata in Jihadi Archives
The presence of metadata in the jihadi film footage is another indication that the videos are intended for broadcast and not merely for online circulation. Metadata, which is attached to films, consist of digital information intended to describe and identify the media, similar to information a library would attach to a book in its catalogue to describe and identify it. In the case of jihadi films, the metadata usually consist of the media title, a short abstract, the name of the organization, the date of the event, the film’s duration, the logo of the producing organization, and other catalog details.

Adding such data in post production is a time-consuming undertaking, considering the hundreds of films jihadists produce annually. Such an effort would only make sense in the context of a well-established archival and content managed system as is typical of a larger media organization. For large digital archives, metadata is crucial, as it allows fast indexed access to the content and enables fast retrieval so that there would be no need to view each film. For local media branches, creating all of this metadata would be time consuming and would require editor and librarian resources, just as creating a full library book cataloging system would be impractical for the private individual with a few hundred books in their library.

Formatting and Packaging of the Jihadi Movies
Evidence of how these films are packaged and produced further supports the argument that these videos are designed for commercial broadcasting and thus are most likely created by large media organizations. Videos of IED attacks, for example, have all the necessary “ingredients” for primetime viewing. They are high quality; they are short (up to 90 seconds) and include all the crucial background information about the organization carrying out the attack as well as about the attack itself. In a sense, they are created as self-contained infomercials made to fit a rigid television programming schedule. Such a format would be unnecessary if the films were intended for random distribution on the internet, where video clips can be uploaded and viewed in many formats, lengths, and qualities.

Another feature which makes it unlikely that the videos are produced by local media branches is the fact that their content is produced in multiple languages (i.e. Arabic, English, French, German, etc.), packaged in varying formats (i.e. Windows Media Player, Quick Time, RealPlayer, etc.) and recorded for diverse narrowcasting and audiences (in a wide range of formats and sizes, for high-speed Internet, dialup connections, embedded use, and mobile devices).[6] Such complex, professional, and very expensive production would be prohibitive for field outlets. Moreover, for local groups which simply wish to publicize their successes, such complex production would be overkill as they could achieve their goal by relying on video-sharing sites or jihad forums for posting their films.

Uniformity of the Jihadi Films’ Media Structure
The uniformity of the various media elements such as titles, credits, transitions, and duration, also indicates that the material is produced under the auspices of one or more large, centralized, and standard-conscious organizations. The following video clips presenting IED attacks illustrate some of these canonized formats:

clip_image002[18]

Media Outlet: Al-Furqan Media Production

Clip Number:

1

Clip Number:

2

Clip Title:              

Destroying a US Hummer in Ramadi

Clip Title:

IED vs. 2 Iraqi Army Humvees – Baghdad

Duration:

01:04

Duration

01:05

Release Date:

28/01/2007

Release Date:

22/08/2008

clip_image004[18]

 

clip_image006[16]

 

Clip Number:

3

Clip Title:

IEDs on American Foot Patrol – Anbar

Release Date:

18/05/2007

Duration:

01:08

clip_image008[14]

 

clip_image002[22]

Media Outlet: Al-Ansar Media Foundation

Clip Number:        

4

Clip Number:        

5

Clip Title:               

IED US Tank – Ninawa Province – Mosul

Clip Title:

IED on an Army Hammer – Mosul

Duration:               

00:58

Duration

01:03

Release Date:

28/12/2008

Release Date:

03/01/2010

clip_image004[22]

 

clip_image006[20]

 

Clip Number:        

6

Clip Title:

IED vs. US Minesweeper – Ninawa Mosul

Release Date:

28/12/2008

Duration:

00:52

clip_image008[18]

 

clip_image002[28]

Media Outlet: As-Sahab Media Production

Clip Number:        

7

Clip Number:        

8

Clip Title:

IED on Afghan Army Car- Metshedad

Clip Title:                 

Powerful IED Strike Destroys US Humvee

Duration:

01:00

Duration:               

00:43

Release Date:

26/03/2008

Release Date:  

07/08/2008

clip_image004[28]

 

 

 

Clip Number:        

9

Clip Title:

Powerful IED Strike Destroys US Humvee

Duration:               

00:43

Release Date:       

07/08/2008

clip_image006[26]

 

clip_image002[30]

Media Outlet: Al-Andalus Media Production

Clip Number:        

10

Clip Title:              

Three IEDs on the Algerian Army

Duration:               

08:04 (3 movies 1.15 minutes each)

Release Date:  

14/10/ 2009

clip_image004[30]

 

 

Clip

Introduction

S. Effects

Titles

Abstract

Captions

Transitions

Clip Length

Logo

Credits

1

x

x

x

x

x

x

64 seconds

x

x

2

x

x

x

x

x

x

65 seconds

x

x

3

x

x

x

x

x

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68 seconds

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x

4

x

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x

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x

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58 seconds

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x

5

x

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x

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63 seconds

x

x

6

x

x

x

x

x

x

52 seconds

x

x

7

x

x

x

x

x

x

60 seconds

x

x

8

x

x

x

x

x

x

43 seconds

x

NA

9

x

x

x

x

x

x

88 seconds

x

x

10

x

x

x

x

NA

x

75 seconds

x

x

Figure 6: Video clip matrix

As can be seen in Figure 7, a comparison of films of similar genre (attacks using IEDs) produced by three ostensibly distinct and geographically remote jihadi media outlets reveals a high level of similarity. The films’ length in all cases is approximately 90 seconds. All clips open with high impact logos and special effects animation. Each frame’s duration prior to the transition is carefully timed, with the initial intro followed by special effect screens and the clip title.

Structure of Jihadi Video Segment
Figure 7: The complete video editing, production and structure (click image to see full size)

The message after the title usually shows a Quranic verse or other religious text followed by the feature movie with the targets of interest usually tracked by either an arrow or a circle. The moment of the attack is replayed three times and then, finally, the film ends with credits and organizational logos. Needless to say, such a definable formulaic pattern cannot be accidental.

Preparation of Jihadi Films for a Pre-Set Viewing Schedule
The distribution of jihadi film content is almost never done ad hoc; rather, it is done according to a pre-planned schedule. Analysis of the main jihadi media archives as far back as 2006 reveals a steady flow of postings to fileshare sites such as Archive.org, Adrive, Zshare, FDCupload, and gettyfile. How they are organized and classified is more easily seen at websites such as As-sahab.blog.com and the jihad archive.

An analysis of new online jihadist films and stills indicates that a great deal of the material was scheduled in advance for distribution and publication. This was done as part of the ongoing effort to keep the war effort on the front burner by taking advantage of the mainstream media’s gullibility and willingness to broadcast these materials whenever they become available. The release of these materials indicates that there is a significant amount of regional field coordination of insurgency activity and there is a planned broadcasting schedule. It also indicates that media is maintained in some form of global archival infrastructure.

A vivid illustration of this throttling method of opportunistically posting content can be seen in a video clip titled “IED Completely Destroys a US Minesweeper – Ninawa Province – Mosul,” documenting a November 14, 2006 attack that was released over six months later, on May 22, 2007. Another example is a clip titled “Shooting a F16 US Plane,” an incident documented as having taken place on November 27, 2006, while the clip was released nearly a year later, on September 13, 2007.

Event Title:

IED on an American Hummer

Event Title:

Shooting a F16 US Plane

Event Date:

14/11/2006

Event Date:

27/11/2006

Publication Date:

23/05/2007

Publication Date:

13/09/2007

clip_image002[40]

clip_image004[40]

Mario D. Gonzalez

clip_image006[36]

clip_image008[28]
Troy Gilbert

Figure 8: Event date vs. media publication timeline

Is There a Global Jihadi Media Policy?
Evidence suggests that jihadi media follows a global policy. For example, a “Media Exuberance” document released by the Al-Boraq media group on September 21, 2006 indicates that jihad media production must abide by legal mandates and guidelines regarding plagiarism, alteration of content, source crediting, and media usage. This strongly implies the existence of an umbrella organization which sets rules and professional standards aimed at better message control, brand building, and further reinforces the trans-regional media production theory.

The Al-Boraq policy paper for example defines “media exuberance” as media publication activity undertaken “without official authority or prior study”,  which apparently refers to any individual postings of jihadi materials without the sanction of a recognized publisher. The paper notes that while some individuals engage in this activity out of a genuine desire to support the struggle, others have “lost the sense of the importance of distribution rights and the authority to conduct work.” The intellectual property violations enumerated include: “distribution of jihadist audio and video products without official sanction or permission from the producer, the distribution of statements by jihadist groups under personal names and user IDs, [and] the release of personal products and works under the names of jihad groups.” The author concluded that these type of practices undermine the “credibility” of jihadist media and distract attention from “official sources.”[7]

Centralized or Independent Media Production?
The frequent adherence to traditional content distribution of jihadi media, as opposed to reliance on low cost or free Web 2.0-3.0 publication platforms such as wikis, blogs and mashups, as well as the creation of metadata, the expensive and sophisticated contents packaging, the uniform appearance of the various media elements, the staged publication schedule, and the apparent global jihad media policy all suggest that what is ostensibly a production by local and independent jihad media entities could in fact mask a spoke and hub centralized organizational structure.

In this scenario, a patchwork of regional field offices and cells maintain territorial presence in various parts of the world, (Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria, Somalia, Gaza), collecting raw footage. They upload/deliver the content to centralized media studios—either state-sponsored or private—which process and brand it accordingly and distribute it to the appropriate regional media outlets. The production and branding, however, is virtual, and is carried out remotely in well-equipped studios with professional video editors and in safe locations away from the conflict zone.

The 2007 arrest of members of the Al-Furqan media organization by U.S. intelligence may help shed some light on this process. According to the case details, regional Al-Furqan teams gathered the raw material from various provinces in Iraq and passed it on to a larger Iraqi Al-Furqan media hub for processing. Surprisingly, this hub, which had a large amount of media storage devices (65 hard drives containing terabytes of electronic files, 18 thumb drives, over 500 CDs, and 12 standalone computers), did not have the proper editing equipment that one would expect to find in a media center that creates films on the advanced level of the Al-Furqan videos.[8]

AQI Media Hierarchy
Figure 9: Structure of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AIQ) media organizations

The captured equipment, appeared to be more for field packaging and distribution of copies of existing product rather than for creating the master itself. This equipment could not have independently produced the Al-Furqan films which contain blue-screen editing, multi-frame overlays, spliced third-party archival material, usage of multiple soundtracks, and the ability to perform blurring facial features, tracking objects—post processing and editing features and techniques which require sophisticated equipment and software usually only found in larger production studios.

The case of Said Namouh, a Moroccan-born Canadian citizen arrested and convicted as a member of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), offers important insight into how local jihadi news is produced in more of a global fashion.[9] According to the court documents, Namouh spent countless hours translating, mixing, repackaging, and distributing numerous videos from diverse geographical locations that included images of attacks against coalition soldiers and of suicide bombings.[10] After his arrest, investigators found videos and other propaganda materials on his computer. It emerged that he had been in charge of publishing video and materials related to Iraqi, Austrian, German, and Gaza terror activities (such as the kidnapping of BBC journalist Alan Johnston by a Palestinian group known as the Army of Islam).[11][12]

The question, however, remains: who are the state(s) sponsors or large commercial news organizations behind these global media productions? The data at hand does not provide a specific answer. Nevertheless, the cases of Al-Zawraa TV and Al-Rai TV provide important hints of how international media and news outlets that utilize multinational satellite broadcasting networks are operating in the service of jihadi organizations, undoubtedly with the full approval and the active sponsorship of sympathetic nation states.

This paper was co authored with Dr. Alshech and was originally published by MEMRI. 

References and Sourcing
[1] Wikis, blogs, forums, and mashups
[2] Al-Zawraa TV, the pro-Sunni satellite television channel owned by former Iraqi MP Mish’an Al-Jabouri, broadcased via satellites operated by the Riyadh-based Arabsat.
[3] Al-Rai TV broadcasted from Syria via the Eurobird 2 satellite, which belongs to the European Eutelsat company, as well as via the Atlantic Bird 4 satellite, which also belonged to Eutelsat, but was leased in September 2005 to the Egyptian Nilesat company, and is now called Nilesat 103.
[4] Channel owner Mish’an Al-Jabouri is known to have close operational and financial links to insurgency groups in Iraq.
[5] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 2054, “In the Footsteps of Al-Zawraa TV, a Channel. Affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Saddam Regime Broadcasts Anti-U.S. Terror Attacks – This Time from Syria,” September 17, 2008.
[6] Dissemination of information to a narrow audience, not to the general public.
[7] September 21, 2006 study by the Al-Buraq media group titled “Media Exuberance
[8] US targets al Qaeda’s al Furqan media wing in Iraq
[9]
Moroccan terrorist fights to stay in Canada on humanitarian grounds
[10] Defense attacks the credibility of the terrorism expert
[11] Video Released Of BBC Reporter Kidnapped In Gaza
[12] The abduction of British journalist Alan Johnston