Jim’ale The Jihadi Organ Grinder and his Little Tweeting Monkey

Ilhan Omar and the Jihadi Organ Grinder

On August 25, 2019, Ilhan Omar tweeted a cryptic post stating:

“Somali government and peacekeeping forces, need to protect @Hormuud and the Somali telecom industry as they make enormous contribution to the economy and provide vital services. During my visit to Somalia in 2011, I was surprised by the quick evolution of the technology in Somalia.”

Ilhan Omar Save Hormuud
Image 1: Ilhan Omar’s Hormuud Telecom tweet

What Ilhan Omar omitted in her tweet was the actual reasons why she promoted Hormuud, the identity of the people that facilitated her 2011 and subsequent trips to Somalia, and their agendas. Considering the fact that Omar (known back in Somalia as Elmi) has protected status and carries a non-expiring ‘Do not investigate me with extreme prejudice’ certificate, I decided to shed some light on the main subject of her tweet: the mysterious Somali Telecom Hormuud and its founder, Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale—a  cuddly, lovable man with a henna dyed beard and a ceaseless passion for violent jihad.

Who is Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale
Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale AKA ‘Jim’ale’ is one of the wealthiest Somali businessmen and is the founder of the Al Barakat group of companies. He is also the owner of Hormuud Telecom. Beside his business interests, Jim’ale also happens to be the leading financier of the al-Shabaab, a Somali Salafi jihadi terrorist organization which since 2006 has been responsible for dozens of car and suicide bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and targeted killing of thousands of innocent Somalis.

In the mid-2000s, Jim’ale gained enough notoriety to get added to US and UN travel bans, assets freeze databases, and targeted arms embargo lists imposed by paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of Resolution 1844.

Ali Yousif Ahmed Al-Nouri
Image 2: Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale, the red-bearded jihadi founder of the Somali Hormuud Telecom and the Barakat money transfer companies

Jim’ale is not some small-time Kalashnikov wielding terrorist. He is a well known and respected jihadi leader and in this capacity he served in several executive roles within the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, AKA the ‘Somali Islamic Courts Union’. This was the most radical Somali jihadi Islamist political element, the same one which eventually formed the military group known as al-Shabaab (The Youth). Al-Shabab’s ideology is based on hardcore Salafism and Wahhabism and aggressively promotes the concepts of takfir, the excommunication and killing of apostates or unbelievers. The groups political objective is to create an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa that would include not only Somalia but also Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

In 2010, Al-Shabaab was targeted in sanctions by the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 concerning Somalia and Eritrea (the “Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee”). According to the July 18, 2011 report (S/2011/433 Item # 71), Jim’ale was identified as:

“…Al-Shabaab not only attracts their business by imposing lower rates of taxation in Kismaayo than at ports controlled by the Transitional Federal Government but also actively promotes large scale imports of sugar and exports of charcoal by offering preferential access and tax breaks to Al-Shabaab affiliated businesses. Two of the most prominent figures in the network are businessmen with historical linkages to militant Islamist groups in Somalia: Abukar Omar Adaani and Ahmed Nur Jim’aale.

Jim’ale was also marked as being related to the Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, another Ilhan Omar idol, who triggered the Battle of Mogadishu:

“Mohamad Warsame is from the same sub-clan as General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, and was once known as being General Aidid’s representative in Bakaara market. Through his presence in Bakaara, he has developed a working relationship with Mr. Jim’ale.”

Jim’ale’s support for Somali Islamic fundamentalist terror goes far beyond a business venture; he is openly aligned with the al-Shabaab and other jihadi Salafi strategy and ideology. In the past, he provided major funding and political support for Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was listed by the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee. Former al-Shabaab Deputy Emir Muktar Robow also collaborated closely with Aweys and Jim’ale in consolidating their leadership role during the early 2010s in al-Shabaab’s political and ideological leadership struggle.

Sample imagery published by the Somali opposition account “ToughStrategy”
Image 3: Sample imagery published by the Somali opposition account “ToughStrategy” about the untouchable Jim’ale, which got him banned from Twitter

In 2007, Jim’ale established a front company in Djibouti for jihadi financing and logistics called the Investors Group (in 2012, it made it onto the UN terror watch list). One of the goals of the group was to destabilize Somaliland through the funding of extremist activities and weapons purchases (an objective which Ilhan Omar supports). The group provided the funding and logistics in smuggling small arms of Qatari and Turkish origin from Eritrea through Djibouti into the 5th region of Ethiopia, where the Salafi jihadi groups received the shipments. 

Transportation equipment used to smuggle weapons and ammunition
Image 4: Transportation equipment used to smuggle weapons and ammunition

In 2009, Jim’ale managed one of the largest Hawala funds in Somalia where he collected zakat (alms for the poor). The majority of the proceedings from this fund were routed to al-Shabaab. In the same year Jim’ale also worked with other like-minded individuals to undermine the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by not participating in Somali reconciliation efforts. 

The 2009 United Nations Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia identifies Jim’ale as one al-Shabaab’s chief financiers (pages 10-11). It also directly linked his company Hormuud to al-Shabaab.

In 2010, Jim’ale established several mobile-to-mobile money transfer businesses such as ZAAD and offered them to al-Shabaab to make international money transfers more difficult to trace by eliminating the need to show any form of identification at the point of transaction.

Somalia Mobile money Payments a major source of funding for Al-Shabaab
Image 5
: Somali Telecom, money exchanges, and mobile payment platforms owned and controlled by Ahmed Nur Ali Jim’ale are one of the major sources of funding for al-Shabaab

By 2011, Jim’ale was actively supporting al-Shabaab by offering them free cellphone communications, use of company vehicles, food, aid, and political advice. He also organized fundraisers for al-Shabaab through various Somali business groups. This fundraising activity included anonymous Turkish and Qatari donations to Jim’ale’s ‘charitable ventures’ which in turn used Djibouti based financial intermediaries to send that money to al-Shabaab.

Jim’ale is by no means a silent business partner in Hormuud Telecom, rather he is in full control of the company and its donations to al-Shabaab affiliates. These include large lump sum payments in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. In addition to the logistics support, Jim’ale through Hormuud has also provided al-Shabaab with privately paid foreign fighters from countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Spokespersons for moderate Somali groups have also warned the Somali people not to use Hormuud Telecom because Hormuud personnel listen-in on all conversations and share the intelligence with al-Shabaab.

In 2016, in part due to a large amount of progressive political lobbying and lubricating a lot of palms with tons of ‘grease’, President Obama’s state department and the US treasury removed Jim’ale from their registries and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list.

Sampling of al-Shabab Jihadi Terror Attacks in Mogadishu
Image 6
: The butcher’s bill for one year of Hormuud Telecom funding for al-Shabaab. Some of these massive death figures repeat themselves in 2018

Harmuud, the Little Jihadi Shindig
The following short listing of Hormuud staff members who have transitioned from the corporate world to full-time employment in hands-on jihadist terrorism helps illustrate the tight coupling between Jim’ale, Hormuud Telecom, al-Shabaab, and several associated large scale terror attacks in Somalia:

  1. Khalif Warsame (Khalif Adale): head of NGO affairs of al-Shabaab, was a member of Hormuud telecom executive team. He is married to Nadifo Ali Jim’ale, the sister of the chairman of Hormuud Ahmed-nur Ali Jim’ale. Nadifo currently resides in the UAE.
  2. Dahir Ga’amey (Abdi Al Haq): chief judge of al-Shabaab, was a member of the executive team of Hormuud Telecom and Jim’ale’s Al Barakat group of companies.
  3. Hassan Muhidin Hassan (Bistolo weyneh): was manager of the Hormuud Telecom office in Villa Somalia. He took part in the al-Shabaab operation to assassinate former Somali prime minister by driving the hit team in his car.
  4. Abdiweli Ahmed Diriye: was a top Hormuud Telecom administrative official. He enabled the safe passage of an explosives loaded truck that killed over 500 people in Mogadishu on October 14, 2017.
  5. Mukhtar Haji Mohamud: was a senior representative of Taaj express; a company owned by Hormuud Telecom Albarakat group wired the money that was used to purchase the explosive truck. The money was wired to Italy to Sheikh Hassan, representative of Taaj Express. He is the person who bought the truck that was used during the October 14, 2017 massacre.
  6. Haji Qaaluu Abdi Ad Ali Jim’ale: an executive member of Hormuud Telecom, was the operational coordinator of the October 14, 2017 truck bomb. He is also the nephew of Ahmed-nur Ali Jim’ale and a card carrying member of the Amniyat branch of al-Shabaab.
  7. Basira Abdi (real name Maryan): the woman who carried out the suicide attack that killed Mogadishu mayor Abdurahman Yarisow, graduated from Al Nur school, the school is managed by Hormud Telecom and Al-Barakat group.
  8. Abdikarim Mohamed Kariye: the al-Shabaab head of finance, was the operations manager of Hormuud Telecom, Taaj Express, Alburuuj Construction, Salaam Somali Bank, and Beco Powering, all Hormuud group subsidiaries of the Al-Barakat Group.
  9. Abdihakim Hassan Idow (Hiirane): a former top official of Hormuud Telecom and Salaam Bank Africa–Djibouti, is the head of al-Shabaab logistics in the Horn of Africa.

Hormuud telecom top officials who are also directly affiliated with the al-shabab Jihadi Terrorist organization
Image 7: Sampling of Hormuud Telecom top officials who are also directly affiliated with the al-Shabaab jihadi terrorist organization

So, there you have it. Ilhan Omar, a sitting Minnesota congresswoman, is openly promoting on social media the interests of Hormuud, a known front and funding source of al-Shabaab, a jihadi terrorist organization with the blood of thousands of innocent Somalis on its hands. Considering just how outrageous all of this should be, you’ve got to give Omar credit where credit is due: in one year, she managed to acquire the best political and media kevlar vest money can buy and is now dodging every funding and FARA question without even blinking.

A US based muslim Somali Ilhan Omar Supporter promoting al-Shabab terror attacks
Image 8
: What Ilhan Omar’s Somali fellow clan members think about Harmuud and it’s affiliation with al-Shabaab. A US based Muslim Somali Ilhan Omar supporter named Reggie Warsame promoting al-Shabaab terror attacks

So what do we learn from this abridged tale of third world tale of grift and corruption and Islamic terror? Perhaps it is that in this post-modern world, we (and our federal three letter agencies) just can’t be judgmental about fluid and passé concepts like terrorism, treason, and murder. Considering this epiphany, it may not be a bad idea for US treasury and the constituents of Minnesota’s 5th congressional district to chip in and indeed help “protect” the Somali Hormuud Telecom. Because if they don’t, al-Shabaab may run into financial difficulties and have to cut back on their suicide car bomb program for 2020. And who wants that?

References and Sourcing
XRVision Sentinel AI Platform – Face recognition, image reconstruction, and object classification

Muslim fraternitati fieri delenda est!

Copyright 2020 Yaacov Apelbaum, All Rights Reserved.

The Salafi Style Guide

The Salafi Style Guide

Since 9/11, the discourse about the Jihadi movement has diverged into two distinct camps (1) the apologetic and (2) the sensationalistic. Unfortunately, beyond the MSM’s focus on the gory details of terrorism, little is being done in the way exploring the inner workings of this phenomenon and it’s impact on the US. The Jihadi movement remains largely a taboo subject in the media, academia, and government. The same applies to the social and political characterization of Salafism and how/if it differs from other Sunni groups.

Salafism is associated with strict interpretation of Islam–especially in the West–and is the leading ideology of the Jihadists who espouse violent jihad against non−believers (Kafirs) and those they deem to be enemies of Islam which may even include other fellow Muslims (Takfir). Some of the better known Salafi organizations are the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Al−Qaeda, and ISIS/ISIL. Since the early 1990s, the Salafi movement has gained a strong foothold in many urban centers through the massive expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations and Qatari funding of Islamic causes in Europe and the US. Currently there are over 200 Salafi mosques in the US and this number is growing steadily.

To the public who is not versed in Islamic history, religion, and culture, all Muslims seem to behave monolithically, but that is not the case. There are many variants in the Syafii, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali streams that make up the Sunni school of Islam. Each of these four groups exhibit specialized traits through dress and ritual observance. This is even more pronounced with the adherents of Salafism who demonstrate unique characteristics among all Sunni practitioners.

It is true that you don’t need to know how to build a watch in order to tell the time but a watchmaker ignorant of the inner workings of a clock makes for a lousy horologist. So in this spirit, I dedicate this post to all of you watchmakers out there who in 2010 and onwards had to burn/shred/swallow all of the in-depth training materials on the subject.

The Salafi Movement 101
By way of a quick introduction, the Salafi movement is an offshoot of Wahhabism and Hanbalism. It’s a relative latecomer (18th−19th century) and unlike mystic streams like Sufism, it represents a romantic and idealized view of history. In many ways, it is similar to other contemporary sociopolitical movements like anarchism, communism, and fascism that emerged at the same time and attempted to reshape the traditional bonds of religion, economics, and politics and align them with the realities of the industrial world.

The emergence of modern Salafism can be roughly traced to:

  1. The formation of the 18th−century Wahhabi movement in the Arab Peninsula. One of the triggers for this was the Arab ruler’s disdain for the corrupt Ottoman Empire. In several regards, this was a replay of the Abbasid Revolution of the 7th-8th centuries.
  2. The late 19th century birth of European inspired nationalism in Egypt. This movement formed as a counter response to British and French imperialism as it was manifested through first the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt and then through massive colonial projects like the British railway in Egypt and the French Suez Canal.

At its core, the Salafi movement advocates a return to the traditions of the salaf  (literally: ‘ancestors’ or ‘the pious predecessors’). These are taken to be the first three generations of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad who died in 632 CE.

There is a lot of legal and ceremonial literature about Salafism but there also seems to be a shortage of accurate and consistent basic how−to guides. This appears to be an ongoing problem for new recruits and converts. As Salafi organizations around the world expand through Internet outreach programs, they frequently re−publish various visual aids in an effort to impart the complex religious practices to their new followers. Ironically, many of these guides are themselves flawed.

Pray like a Salafi
Image 1: An example of a Salafi Do’s and Don’ts guide showing the basic positions for a prayer sequence

Salafy Prayer Posture-2
Image 2: An example of a Salafi Do’s and Don’ts guide showing the basic positions for a prayer sequence

Salafy Prayer Posture-3

Image 3: An example of a Salafi prayer guide showing the basic positions for a prayer sequence (Note inconsistency in hand placement in Fig 2)

Upon a closer examination of Salafi doctrine, we can find that even the simplest ritualistic practices such as the position of the toes and fingers during prayer trigger passionate legal debates. Their literature is full of fatwas (religious rulings) on almost every aspect of personal and communal life including subjects like food, hygiene, social interaction, dress, makeup, facial hair, and even use of jewelry. Because of the highly formulaic and ritualized nature of this movement, among the distinguishing marks of Salafi practice are the dress and the prayer routines. All Muslims are commanded to pray five times a day and go through certain steps during the prayer sequence such as kneeling and prostration. Salafi practitioners, however, maintain a rigid set of movements that is unique to them. Image 2 illustrates the prayer variations within Sunni streams and Shia.

Variation in Sunni Prayer Sequences
Image 2: Variations in the performance of the various steps in the prayer sequence across various schools of Islam

Many Shades of Gray
The uniqueness of the Salafi prayer style and practices like dress and grooming are based on the doctrine of a return to the ‘perfect’ historical period of the 7th century. Because of this, the Salafi dogma rejects religious innovations (bid’ah) such as obedience to the secular state and practices such as watching movies and playing music. It also calls for the implementation and strict enforcement of sharia (Islamic law) anywhere Muslims live.

Below are two guides that focus on the details of Salafi dress, grooming, and daily prayer sequences. Due to the limited real−estate on this page, you will have to click on the posters in order to view and read them in full size.

Salafi Dress Characteristics Poster
Image 3: Typical Salafi dress, grooming, and appearance. The dress styles represent multiple geographical regions such as the Arabic peninsula, Afghanistan to the Levant

Salafi Dress 3    Salafi Dress 1 Salafi Dress 2    Salafi Dress 4
Additional variations of in dress and attire (supplement to Image 3)

Salafi Prayer Sequence Poster
Image 4: The Complete Salafi Prayer Sequence

References and Sourcing
XRVision Sentinel AI Platform – Face recognition, image reconstruction, and object classification

© Copyright 2018 Yaacov Apelbaum, All Rights Reserved.