Several days ago, I got an email from PayPal Support with the title: “We noticed unusual activity on your account”. The body of the email contained details of a suspicious transaction that allegedly occurred in my account and it invited me to click on the hyperlink “I Didn’t Authorize This Purchase” to dispute the transaction. At first blush, the email seemed well formatted and looked possibly legit.
I took a closer look at the embedded URL and noticed that it had the following shortened alias: http://bit.ly/1ml6nhf which resolved to: http://account-service-costumer.com/us/webapps/mpp/home. Taken together with the obvious Chinglish verbiage in the body of the email, it became apparent that this was not an actual PayPal address but rather a phishing site.
I must say, I was taken back by the quality of the site. Whoever was responsible for setting it up invested a lot of time and effort into it. In a departure from typical phishing site design where most of the bogus links either don’t work or are eliminated, this one had multiple layers of linkage functionality designed to make the site appear real. For example, when I clicked on the “Send Money” link, I was prompted to enter a transfer amount and my recipient’s e-mail address. Impressive functionality.
Structure and Functionality
In terms of navigational structure and content, the phishing site was almost an identical copy of the actual PayPal website. It had identical layout, images, and link names. It even had all of the streaming media. One note of interest is that even though the link names were verbatim, most of them just reloaded the phishing site landing page with the exception of “Investor Relations” and “Feedback Links” at the bottom which loaded external pages. This is a departure from the previous phishing practice of simply eliminating such links from the site altogether.
As far as the actual phishing exploit is concerned, the “Login” and “Sign Up” links are the core components. If you click on them they redirect to a fake PayPal login page where you are prompted to enter your user ID and password after which you land on a form intended to verify your identify which collects all of your personal information including DOB, SS number, phone number, and address. Double whammy!
Site Hosting and Publication
The site was registered in the US just two weeks ago via the Name.com web register and its IP is hosted on a dedicated server in the New Jersey/New York area.
This is somewhat unusual because most of the phishers tend to host from abroad on repurposed or hacked servers serving other legitimate content.
This was probably done in an effort to survive a cursory URL Whois check that would confirm that the hosting is in the US (which would be the case for the real PayPal servers).
Heads up! It appears that we are witnessing a revolution in phishing affairs through the escalation in quality and detail of these sites. Considering this, it may behoove payment industry providers such as PayPal to start utilizing image match search capability to detect and block the appearance of such sites in near real-time instead of passively waiting to receive fraud alert messages from their customers weeks after the phishing campaign has wrought its havoc.
© Copyright 2016 Yaacov Apelbaum, All Rights Reserved.
Tokens of Distrust
It was on a starless March night,
The spear phishers went out for bite.
Through a zero day vulnerability,
They breached RSA’s network security.
A Trojan attached to an email transmission,
Gave the attackers remote access permission.
Deep into the corporate systems they dove,
Collecting the SecureID key seeds treasure trove.
The theft effected over forty million tokens,
Transparency failed and trust was broken.
A few weeks followed and on a moonless May night,
The spear fishers returned with a renewed appetite.
Over the internet via secure VPN and a forged key,
They breached Lockheed’s defenses and Pwned ’their IP.
Ties That Bind
Identity, how do I bind thee to an object? Let me recount the days.
In the days of Spring, by a secret.
In the days of Summer, by a token.
In the days of Fall, by who you are.
In the days of Winter, by seasons’ past and where you’ve been.
A little shiftless man named Phil,
got a CISO gig through a shady deal.
Clueless about APT threats,
He managed upwards like a rat.
Pen tests and audits took a back seat,
To what the cafeteria was serving to eat.
When the company was finally breached by a hack,
He said “C’est la vie! The insurance will cover our back.”
IP traffic flood,
Malignant packets rush-in,
Snort calmly says: “Halt!”